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G.C.Goddu 
The aim of Critical Thinking is to explicitly and directly teach critical thinking 
skills and to facilitate the use of these skills to subjects and contexts beyond 
critical thinking (v, 1). Though the book is primarily intended as an introduc-
tory textbook for the teaching of critical thinking, Fisher maintains that the 
"material is presented in such a way that it can be worked through on a self-
study basis"(vi). 
The book begins with a brief preface, in which Fisher provides some 
suggestions for the use of the text, and continues with eleven content chap-
ters. Chapter 1 is devoted to introductory material; Chapters 2-5 are devoted 
to identifYing, clarifying, and interpreting reasoning; and Chapters 6-11 to 
evaluating reasoning. Each chapter is divided into sections and subsections, 
many of which include practice problems devoted to the material of that sub-
section. Each chapter ends with a clear and concise summary of the chapter's 
key elements. The text ends with (i) a questions appendix with a bank of fifty-
nine argument passages of varying length and complexity, (ii) solutions to 
many, though not all, of the practice problems, (iii) a glossary of key terms, 
and (iv) a brief bibliography. 
In the first sections of Chapter 1, Fisher presents several definitions of 
critical thinking and extracts those elements he considers most significant-at 
the very least critical thinking is active, reflective, skillful thinking that must 
meet certain standards of clarity, relevance, adequacy, and coherence. He also 
provides an explicit statement of the general strategy he adopts for directly 
teaching critical thinking. He writes: 
We shall identify some fundamental skills which are essential to good 
critical thinking; we shall then show some characteristic weaknesses we 
are all inclined to display when doing these kinds of thin kings; after that 
we shall show a good model of thinking in that way (say decision mak-
ing); then you will practice this kind of thinking; and finally you will be 
faced with whole tasks ... in which you will need to deploy the relevant 
skills at the appropriate points. (pp. 6-7) 
In Chapter 2, which concerns identifying reasons and conclusions, Fisher 
discusses the standard indicators of conclusions and premises such as 'thus', 
'hence', 'therefore' and 'because', 'since', and 'for'. In the absence of such 
©InformaILogicVol. 22, No.2 (2002): pp.181-186. 
182 G. C. Goddu 
indicators, Fisher recommends the "therefore" test, which he articulates as 
follows: "the 'therefore' test asks whether it makes sense to insert the word 
'therefore' between two sentences" (p. 26). Though clearly not generalizable, 
the test "can be very useful in deciding when and what reasoning is being 
presented" (p. 26). Fisher also provides an extended list of other reasoning 
language beyond the indicator words, such as words that indicate how strong 
we think the reasoning or support is, the source of the support, the nature of 
the support, etc. Fisher ties the chapter together with whole argument exer-
cises involving (a) identifying and typing the reasoning language in arguments 
made by others and (b) using the language to construct arguments of one's 
own. 
Chapter 3 is devoted to patterns of reasoning. He identifies the simplest 
pattern as the "one reason, one conclusion" pattern. He then distinguishes the 
"side-by-side" reasons pattern in which more than one reason is offered in 
support of a single conclusion from the "chain" or "serial" reasoning pattern, 
in which reasons are offered for a conclusion which in turn is used to support 
an additional conclusion and so on. Within the "side-by-side" pattern, Fisher 
identifies a special pattern, viz. the "joint" reasons pattern, in which the rea-
sons "have to be taken together to give support to their conclusion" (p. 37). In 
a final section of this chapter Fisher briefly discusses drawing more than one 
conclusion, and so, terminology aside, Fisher here provides his own versions 
of the serial, linked, convergent, and divergent reasoning patterns, though his 
emphasis is clearly on the first three. This chapter is rounded out with sec-
tions on (a) recognizing complex reasons such as conditionals and disjunctions 
and (b) a typical discussion of being able to distinguish arguments from expla-
nations. 
In Chapter 4, Fisher briefly tackles assumptions and the effect of context 
on interpreting and weighing claims, evaluating arguments, etc. He then codi-
fies the material to date in what he calls a "thinking map", "a list of key 
questions you should ask when weighing up an argument" (p. 57). His core 
list of questions is: 
1. What is the main conclusion? 
2. What are the reasons? What is their structure? 
3. What is assumed? 
4. Clarify the meaning of terms, claims, or arguments which need it. 
5. Are the reasons acceptable? 
6. Do they support the conclusion? Are there other relevant consider-
ations/arguments? 
7. What is your overall evaluation in the light of 1 through 67 (p. 56) 
Fisher concludes the identifying, clarifying, and interpreting reasoning sec-
tion of his text in Chapter 5, which is devoted to clarifying and interpreting 
expressions and ideas. Here he provides another thinking map, which includes 
such questions as: What is the problem? Who is the audience? What will 
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provide sufficient clarification for this audience? This thinking map is intended 
to clarify and add more detail to item 4 of his core thinking map. 
Chapters 6 and 7 address the acceptability of reasons. He first distinguishes 
different types of claims, such as factual claims, value claims, and definitions 
and maintains that if these different sorts of claims "do require further justifi-
cation this will need to be appropriate to the claim being made" (p. 84). He 
then presents and explains six questions one might ask for judging acceptabil-
ity skillfully: How certain is it claimed to be? Does the context influence ac-
ceptability? Does it require expertise/research to decide? Is it widely known or 
believed? How well does it fit with our other beliefs? Is it from a credible 
source? (p. 87). All of Chapter 7 is devoted to this last question, which 
provides a standard treatment of credibility, i.e., one that is typical in critical 
thinking, informal logic, and philosophy of science classes. For example, Fisher's 
treatment includes asking such questions as: Does the source have the rel-
evant expertise? Do they have a vested interest or bias? Is the justification 
primary or secondary? Is the claim plausible or unlikely on its face? Is there 
corroboration? 
In Chapter 8, Fisher addresses the question of good inferences. Most of 
the discussion is devoted to articulating and giving examples of different stand-
ards that an inference could meet to be considered good, viz., validity, proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, more likely than not on the balance of the evi-
dence, and reasonable, though he does not say much about the last on the 
grounds that "it is too general to say much of substance except in particular 
cases and contexts" (p. 123). 
In Chapter 9, Fisher adds brief discussions of the complications of evalu-
ating inferences due to assumptions and other relevant considerations and 
then finishes the chapter with some extended examples that involve much of 
what has been presented previously in the book. 
In Chapters 10 and 11, Fisher applies many of the techniques previously 
introduced to evaluating causal and decision making reasoning, while at the 
same time pointing out some special questions that must be asked in these 
cases. For example, in the case of causal explanation, the questions include: 
What are the possibilities in the case, and Which possibility is rendered most 
likely by the evidence? In the case of decision making, the questions include: 
What makes the decision necessary, and What are the possible consequences 
of various options? 
Critical Thinking is clearly-written and easily accessible. The method of 
"thinking maps", Le., key questions, focuses and unifies the text in a way that 
is absent from many critical thinking or informal logic texts. For example, 
fairly standard texts, such as those by Kahane and Cavender, Enni~, and 
Epstein, I cover diverse topics such as language, deductive reasoning, induc-
tive reasoning, fallacies, and particular uses of argumentation such as legal, 
scientific, or business arguments, but do not necessarily hang together well as 
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whole texts. The different sections and chapters of Fisher's book, on the other 
hand, each address different questions of the clearly interconnected thinking 
maps. For example, the thinking map of Chapter 7 provides more detail to the 
"Is the source credible?" question of the thinking map presented in Chapter 6, 
which in turn provides more detail to the "Are the reasons acceptable?" ques-
tion from the original thinking map. Even his last two chapters, which are 
devoted to special cases of argumentation, i.e., causal and decision making, 
are tied in with the rest of the text. 
Fisher's general approach via key questions does, however, come with a 
cost. There are no, or at best extremely cursory, discussions of such specific 
topics as, for example, categorical or propositional forms of arguments, sam-
pling and generalization, and reasoning by analogy, which can be found in the 
other texts cited. Perhaps most significant, however, is the absence of a dis-
cussion of fallacies. Given that Fisher says that part of his avowed approach 
is to "show some characteristic weaknesses we are all inclined to display 
when doing these kinds of thin kings" (p. 6) this absence is especially puzzling. 
In fact, despite his explicit claim that his method includes showing character-
istic weaknesses in our reasoning, almost no attention is devoted to recogniz-
ing poor reasoning. Other than a brief mention of the fallacy of equivocation in 
Chapter 5 and a brief discussion of typical (poor) reactions to arguments in 
the beginning of Chapter 6, the only real account of "poor reasoning" shows 
up in Chapters 10 and 11 in which Fisher indicates some common flaws in our 
causal and decision making thinking. Hence, anyone who considers fallacies, 
discussion of various types of inductive reasonings, or argument form to be a 
significant part of a critical thinking course will have to look elsewhere. 
The topics Fisher does present are generally well-treated, though there are 
some details of his text which require further clarification and explanation. 
Many of these details could be resolved or filled out by a competent instructor. 
Unfortunately, a careful "self-study" reader would be left with several unan-
swered questions. I present these problematic details in the order in which 
they appear in the book. 
(a) Fisher makes distinctions amongst various patterns of argument and 
holds that recognizing different patterns is important for evaluation (p. 35), 
but no reference is made to these patterns in the evaluation sections of his 
text. 2 In addition, Fisher's advice for deciding what kind of structure the 
argument has includes: "If it is hard to decide, then interpret the argument in 
whichever way gives the strongest case" (p. 38). But with no guidance on 
how different patterns influence evaluation or strength of arguments, this 
advice is hardly enlightening. (Note also that despite a chapter on argument 
patterns, there is no diagramming of arguments, though sometimes reasons 
are labeled as R 1, R2 and conclusions as C 1, C2, etc.) 
(b) Fisher's definition of assumptions, i.e., "a belief which is clearly ac-
cepted or 'taken for granted' by a speaker or writer but is not stated or made 
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explicit by them" (p. 47) appears to be inconsistent with his claim concerning 
assumptions that: "Of course the author might not have even thought of these 
things, but for the argument to carry much weight, they have to be assumed 
to be true as well as the reasons which are explicitly given" (p. 49). How can 
an assumption both be taken for granted by the author and not even thought of 
by the author? In addition, in Fisher's first two examples concerning assump-
tions, the assumption added is essentially, "if the reasons, then the conclu-
sion" but he himself warns against the usefulness of this sort of move on the 
grounds that "If we thought the original inference was questionable, our doubts 
must apply equally to the added, hypothetical assumption" (p. 128). I also 
question the merit of adding this sort of assumption, since the arguer may 
believe the "if the reasons, then the conclusion" conditional, but only because 
he or she accepts the original argument. Hence, in such cases, the conditional 
would not be an assumption of the argument at all. 
(c) In Chapter 5 on clarifying ideas, Fisher's thinking map includes as 
separate questions, "3. Given the audience, what will provide sufficient clari-
fication for present purposes?" and "6. How much detail is needed by this 
audience in this situation?" (p. 77). I wonder what is the difference between 
these questions. Unfortunately, Fisher's only comment on the latter question 
is to say that we do not need to add to what has already been said. 
(d) In Chapter 6, Fisher discusses answering the question "Are the rea-
sons Acceptable (true, etc.)?" (p. 80). He begins by explaining how answer-
ing this question works. He writes, "First we must decide whether it is true 
that ... " (p. 81). But if acceptability requires truth, then such alleged accept-
ability questions as "How certain is it claimed to be" are irrelevant, whereas 
"whether it is widely known or believed, and how well it fits with our other 
beliefs" are only relevant insofar as they are reliable indicators of truth. In later 
chapters on evaluating inferences, one of his conditions is that the reasons be 
"true or otherwise acceptable" (p. Ill), but it is far from clear in the text what 
would constitute "otherwise acceptable." 
(e) Finally, Fisher introduces his last standard of evaluation, reasonable, 
but not at all conclusive by comparing it with the previous standard, more 
likely than not on the balance of the evidence. He writes, "Yet again, in many 
everyday situations we present arguments which are meant to be judged by 
still less fierce standards" (p. 112). But is it really true that in many everyday 
situations we argue by providing reasons that we expect do not make the 
conclusion more likely than not? Some would argue that if the reasons are not 
intended to provide at least 50% support to the conclusion, then there just is 
no argument.) Unfortunately, as already mentioned above, this standard does 
not get a separate treatment in the text. But to make matters worse, when 
discussing the "more likely than not" standard, Fisher writes: "The same kind 
of reasoning occurs in many other everyday contexts. It is also common in 
scientific contexts ... "(p. 120). So many everyday contexts are also contexts 
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in which the standard is stronger than reasonable, but not at all conclusive? In 
addition, surely the scientific standards are higher thanjust-more-likely-than-
not-given-the-evidence. 
Again, many of these details could be resolved in the classroom, though 
some, especially (e), may require being modified and clarified for a second 
edition. Some very minor problems that would also require attention for a 
second edition include: (i) the citation of John Stuart Mill's "desired, therefore 
desirable" argument given on page 75 is from Utilitarianism and not On Lib-
erty, and (ii) the argument given in exercise 8.5.4 is, contra the solutions, not 
valid. A purely notational issue that might bear some rethinking is the diver-
gent numbering scheme of sections versus problem questions. For example, 
question 1.5 is the fifth question of Chapter 1, but is located in section 1.1.1 of 
the text, while question 3.4 is located in section 3.7. Some confusion will 
result if one makes the natural assumption that the question numbers will 
correlate with the section in which they are located. 
Despite the need for some tweaking, Critical Thinking remains a very 
clear, precise, and extremely accessible introduction to the core concepts and 
questions of critical thinking. By focusing on key questions, Fisher provides a 
focused and unified text-no small merit when the goal is to facilitate student 
comprehension, uptake, and, most importantly, utilization of critical thinking 
concepts and strategies. Supplemented with additional problems (Fisher him-
self in his preface provides some suggestions on where to look for additional 
stimulus passages) this book provides an excellent text for an introductory 
critical thinking course. 
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